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Smooth Operators: Recent Collective Bargaining in Major League
Baseball
In November of 2011, the ownership in Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Major
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) announced they had agreed to a new
five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would run through the end of
the 2016 season. The announcement of this deal was unique in several ways. First,
unlike recent CBA negotiations in other North American professional sports leagues
such as the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association
(NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL), these appeared to be rather harmo-
nious. There was no war of words in the media between the two sides and the deal was
struck before the end of the existing CBA.
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Abstract
In late 2011, at a time when other leagues such as the National Football League and
the National Basketball Association had engaged in work stoppages, Major League
Baseball owners and the MLB Players Association harmoniously agreed on a new five-
year collective bargaining agreement. This article focuses on the reasons why MLB as
an industry has maintained labor peace after decades of work stoppages. The primary
aspects of the new MLB CBA, such as changes to the revenue sharing system, compet-
itive balance tax, salary arbitration, and the amateur draft are addressed. The manner
in which these economic mechanisms affect areas such as competitive balance will be
analyzed. Lastly, a comparison was undertaken of the collective bargaining environ-
ment in MLB versus other professional sports leagues and other non-sports indus-
tries.
Keywords: Major League Baseball, collective bargaining, revenue sharing, free
agency
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Second, the threat of a work stoppage never appeared to be a possibility. This is in
stark contrast to the other pro leagues mentioned above, which have seen recent work
stoppages as a result of failed labor negotiations. For example, the NHL lost an entire
season in 2004–05 due to the failure to agree on a new labor deal. More recently, the
much-publicized NFL labor talks dragged on throughout the spring and summer of
2011 and resulted in lost out-of-season training activities and a delay in the opening
of training camps. In the fall and winter of 2011, the NBA’s season opening was
delayed over two months due to a work stoppage. While a new CBA in the NBA was
agreed upon after lengthy negotiations and bickering in the press, the season had to be
shortened from 82 to 66 games with those games being played in a condensed 124-day
period.
Third, the MLB labor negotiations were unique in their failure to attract media
attention. The negotiations of other leagues seemed to dominate the popular press in
recent years. The MLB deal was done with almost no controversy, negative statements,
or in-fighting. Labor harmony appears to be omnipresent in MLB. Not only is this dis-
tinct from the other North American professional leagues, but it is a major deviation
from the history of the relationship between team owners and the MLBPA. Between
1972 and 1994, no MLB collective bargaining agreement was made without some type
of work stoppage, whether it was an owner lockout or player strike. While not all of
these stoppages affected the regular season, all of them led to some delay in team activ-
ities such as training camp. Table 1 below shows the nature and extent of MLB’s work
stoppages.
Table 1: History of Work Stoppages in Major League Baseball
Year Nature Length (Days) Regular Season Games Lost
1972 Strike 14 86
1973 Lockout 12 0
1976 Lockout 17 0
1980 Strike 8 0
1981 Strike 50 712
1985 Strike 2 0
1990 Lockout 32 0
1994–1995 Strike 232 938
Source: Zimbalist (2003b). 
It appears that team owners and the MLBPA learned a valuable lesson from their last
work stoppage that occurred in 1994–95 and led to the first cancellation of the World
Series in over a century. The cancellation of the Series and subsequent delay to the start
of the 1995 season did significant short-term damage to MLB. The 1995 season saw a
decrease in attendance and TV ratings. The relationship between work stoppages and
spectator demand is somewhat unclear based on the current body of knowledge, as
will be discussed later in the article. But for MLB in the post-World Series cancellation
world of the mid-1990s, it took, in part, the 1998 home run chase of Mark McGwire
and Sammy Sosa to bring fans back to the ballparks. It appears that the MLB owners
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and players have learned a valuable lesson from that work stoppage and do not wish
to repeat it.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the newest CBA that was agreed on in 2011
between the MLB owners and MLBPA. Special attention will also be given to the
changes in the economic system in MLB that will occur as a result of the new deal,
along with a comparison of the new deal with the prior agreement that had been in
place. In addition, the new CBA will be compared to the most recent labor agreements
that have been made by the three other major North American professional sports
leagues: the NFL, NBA, and NHL. Further, collective bargaining in MLB will be com-
pared with typical union negotiations in non-sports industries in North America.
Lastly, an analysis will be undertaken of which side—players or owners—appears to
have set themselves up for future success as a result of this deal. To provide context, the
article begins with a description of the history of unionization in MLB and a discus-
sion of past CBA negotiations between the MLBPA and team owners.
History of MLB Unionization
Major League Baseball has the longest history of collective bargaining in professional
sports. A great deal of content in this section has been adapted from Staudohar (2000)
and Zimbalist (2003b). The unionization of professional baseball players can be traced
to 1885 when the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players was formed. This
union, along with many subsequent organizations such as the Players’ Protective
Association, the Fraternity of Professional Baseball Players of America, and the
American Baseball Guild, eventually failed, but they served as the groundwork for
future players unions. The primary economic topics of interest for these early unions
were the reserve clause that contractually tied players to their team for the entirety of
their playing career, the funding of player pensions, and insurance issues. None of
these organizations were successful in ending the reserve clause that contractually tied
players to a single team for the entirety of their careers, and only modest gains were
made in player pensions and insurance (“History,” 2012).
The current players union, the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA),
was formed in 1954 with a player, Bob Feller, serving as the first union president. As
with earlier players unions, most CBA negotiations in the 1950s and early 1960s dealt
with relatively minor issues, such as those mentioned earlier, along with topics such as
playing field/ballpark conditions and per diem allowances for traveling teams. The
union was strongly influenced by the team owners and relatively ineffective and pow-
erless until 1966 (Staudohar, 2000). For example, in the early 1960s, the MLBPA’s legal
counsel, Judge Robert Cannon, was in support of the reserve clause that greatly limit-
ed player rights, and had career aspirations to be the commissioner of MLB (Zimbalist,
2003b). However, the bargaining strategy and goals of the MLBPA changed dramati-
cally in 1966 with the hiring of Marvin Miller as its executive director.
In hindsight, it is interesting to note that Miller was not even the MLBPA’s first
choice for the job. Some players did not feel that Miller was the proper selection
because he had no background in baseball. But unlike prior union chiefs, Miller had a
wealth of experience in the unionization and organization of workers. He had previ-
ously been an economist with the United Steelworkers of America (Staudohar, 2000).
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Miller’s negotiating style was different from that of early union leaders. His prede-
cessors had a much more cooperative style in dealing with the owners. Miller used a
more traditional approach toward labor negotiations that was common in other non-
sport industries. His belief was that confrontation and conflict were the only methods
that would be successful for the MLBPA to achieve its goals, with the elimination of
the reserve clause being the primary goal (Staudohar, 2000). The importance of the
reserve clause to the owners is noted by Krautmann, von Allmen, and Berri (2009),
who found that the average apprentice, a player under the reserve clause without access
to arbitration, was paid about 19% of the marginal revenue product (MRP) that he
produced. The model assumed that free agents were paid 100% of their MRP. In fact,
this is the lowest pay as a percentage of MRP across MLB, the NBA, and the NFL,
according to Krautmann et al. (2009).
The owners did not perhaps fully understand the effect that Miller would have on
the business of MLB until 1968, the first year in which Miller represented the players
in CBA negotiations. In 1968, a two-year deal was reached with the most significant
facet of the agreement being an increase in the minimum player salary from $6,000 to
$10,000. While this gain may seem small by today’s standards, this was a major step for
many players who had not seen the minimum salary rise for over a decade; let alone a
67% increase (Staudohar, 2000). Table 2 provides data on the growth of the minimum
and average player salaries over the last 40 years.
Table 2: Progression of Minimum and Average Player Salaries in Major League Baseball
Year Minimum Salary ($) Average Salary ($)
1970 12,000 29,303
1975 16,000 44,676
1980 30,000 143,756
1985 60,000 371,571
1990 100,000 578,930
1995 109,000 1,071,029
2000 200,000 1,998,034
2002 300,000 2,383,235
2005 316,000 2,632,655
2006 327,000 2,866,544
2007 380,000 2,699,292
2008 390,000 3,154,845
2009 400,000 3,240,206
2010 414,000 3,297,828
2011 480,000 3,305,393
Source: http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Minimum_salary
The 1970s was a decade that saw the MLBPA make its most significant gains at the
bargaining table. The three most important changes to the economic system in MLB
were the establishment of a grievance arbitration panel, the institution of free agency,
and the start of salary arbitration. The 1970 CBA established a three-member griev-
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ance arbitration panel that handled disagreements between the two sides; historically,
the commissioner was the final arbitrator on all decisions, and he tended to side with
the owners in almost every instance. The establishment of the grievance panel had sig-
nificant future ramifications. For example, in 1974, Jim “Catfish” Hunter of the
Oakland Athletics had a conflict with team owner Charles Finley over payments that
were to be made by the team into an insurance policy for Hunter; those payments were
never made by Finley. The case was sent to the grievance panel, which ruled in
Hunter’s favor and declared him a free agent, thus making him the first free agent in
modern MLB (Staudohar, 2000).
A year later, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally were also ruled free agents after
they challenged the reserve clause. Both men played the previous season without a
contract and thus stated that they should be free to negotiate with any team because
one interpretation of the reserve clause was that a player had to play one year without
a contract. The grievance panel ruled in the players’ favor, and this led to full free
agency being agreed upon as part of the 1976 CBA. That agreement stipulated that
players with six or more years of MLB experience had the right to unrestricted free
agency, with some compensation to the team losing the player, upon expiration of
their contract (Zimbalist, 2003b). Despite the plethora of changes that have occurred
in the CBA over the past four decades, the six-year waiting period for free agency has
never been altered and is still in existence today. Hakes and Turner (2011) showed that
the biggest impact on player pay is free agency, but high-quality players without free
agency rights also have the ability to reach into the future and obtain some of the high-
er pay associated with free agency by signing multi-year contracts.
Another important gain made by players at the bargaining table occurred in 1973
with the adoption of salary arbitration. The 1974 season was the first in which players
had the right to file for binding salary arbitration. If a player and owner could not
agree on a contract, the case could be heard by an impartial arbitrator. The arbitrator
would rule on the appropriate salary for the player in the upcoming season. All con-
tracts decided upon through arbitration were one year in length. The arbitration
process was final-offer, such that the arbitrator was forced to select the salary offer
given by either the player or the owner, with no compromise. Since 1990, players with
three to five years of MLB experience and the top 17% of players with two years of
experience, had the ability to file for salary arbitration if they could not agree on a con-
tract with their team (Staudohar, 2000). The new CBA that goes into effect for the 2012
season allows for the top 20% of players with two years of experience to be eligible for
arbitration (“Summary,” 2011). Table 3 provides a summary of the CBA highlights
from 1973 to 2012.
Another aspect of CBA negotiations in the 1970s was the prevalence of work stop-
pages. For example, in 1972 the season was delayed 10 days and 86 games were lost due
to a player strike. Four years later, the team owners locked players out of spring train-
ing camp for 17 days when the two sides failed to agree on a new deal. This was an
occurrence that would be repeated over the next two decades (Zimbalist, 2003b).
The 1980s saw more tumultuous CBA negotiations between the team owners and
MLBPA. In 1981, a lengthy player strike lasted 50 days and 712 games were lost. The
1981 season became known as the split season because the strike occurred in the mid-
dle of the season; from June 12 until August 1. The central issue of conflict was the
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amount of compensation a team received if it lost a free agent. The owners wanted to
increase the compensation, while the players believed that increased compensation
would deter teams from signing free agents and, in turn, keep salaries low. A new deal
was eventually signed with the owners making small gains in compensation for lost
free agents. But the strike angered some fans as evidenced by decreases in both atten-
dance and television ratings. However, both bounced back fairly quickly in 1982. But
both sides suffered financially from the work stoppage. It was estimated that the own-
ers lost a combined $72 million in revenues and the players lost about $34 million in
wages (Zimbalist, 2003b).
Another facet of those negotiations was the volatile relationship between Marvin
Miller and the owners’ chief negotiator, Ray Grebey. Both men had reputations as
tough negotiators, Grebey with the General Electric Company and Miller with the
MLBPA and United Steelworkers of America. To say the two men did not like each
other would be an understatement. Instead of negotiating, both men spent a large
amount of time airing their differences in the media. This hindered advancement of
the negotiations. In 1982, Miller announced his retirement as the MLBPA Executive
Director. After having Ken Moffett serve in that role for a short period of time, the
MLBPA selected Donald Fehr to lead it. Fehr, who held that role until 2009, was much
like Miller in his negotiating style and philosophy. He believed in a confrontational
style and had very little, if any, trust in the team owners. In short, similar to his pred-
ecessor Miller, he often viewed the owners as an adversary, not a partner (Staudohar,
2000).
Fehr’s first round of CBA negotiations began in 1984. By then, long-time commis-
sioner Bowie Kuhn had been replaced by Peter Ueberroth. Negotiations began about
two months before the expiration of the CBA on December 31, 1984. A unique aspect
of this round of negotiations occurred in February 1985, when, after pleading finan-
cial hardship, the owners were forced by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
to open their books to the MLBPA; this had not occurred in prior negotiations. The
primary area of negotiation dealt with the funding of the players’ pension by the own-
ers. Traditionally, one-third of the revenue from the MLB’s national TV contract went
into the pension fund. However, as the revenues from TV grew in the 1980s, the own-
ers believed that the amount going into the pension fund was too high (Staudohar,
2000). A conflict arose as the owners’ accounting firm, Ernst & Whitney, concluded
that the owners had an operating loss of $42 million in 1984 and projected a $58 mil-
lion loss for 1985. Simultaneously, Stanford economist Roger Noll was hired by the
MLBPA, and he reported that the owners had operated at a $9 million profit level in
1984 (Zimbalist, 2003b). Thus, the two sides could not even agree on the level of prof-
its/losses that were occurring in the game.
By August 1985, no agreement had yet been reached and the players initiated a
strike. The walkout only lasted two days, and both sides quickly agreed on a new CBA.
The agreement made minor changes to the pension funding, but the larger issue that
was agreed upon was the initiation of a revenue sharing plan among owners.
Traditionally, all revenue from the national TV deals was split equally among all teams.
The 1985 agreement took $20 million annually from the TV contract and used it to
financially aid small-market teams. This opened the door for greater future revenue
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sharing and greatly changed the way in which revenues are shared among MLB teams
(Staudohar, 2000). This deal was in existence until 1990.
In 1990, the owners planned to win major concessions from the MLBPA at the bar-
gaining table. This stance was most likely affected by the players’ being awarded $280
million in damages from the owners due to the 1987 collusion case. In that case, the
MLBPA proved that the owners had colluded in the off-seasons of 1985 and 1986 to
reduce the signing of free agents in an effort to curb the growth of player salaries.
Evidence of this was that 29 of the 33 free agents in 1985 returned to their original
teams in 1986 and the salaries for free agents grew by only five percent; a much small-
er increase than in previous years without collusion. While the case was settled, the
long-term damage from it lasted for years. The distrust from players toward owners
was heightened as a result of the collusion case and it adversely affected future CBA
negotiations (Zimbalist, 2003b).
Within the 1990 CBA negotiations, the owners sought a hard salary cap that would
be equal to 48% of the total ticket sales and media revenues. The owners also pushed
for a “pay to play” salary model for players with less than six years of experience as an
alternative to salary arbitration. Under this model, a player’s salary would be based on
previous on-field performance. The players were seeking a doubling of the minimum
salary along with extending salary arbitration to all players with two years of MLB
experience. This time, the owners acted first by locking the players out of spring train-
ing. The lockout lasted 32 days before an agreement was reached. The owners dropped
all of their primary demands and the players agreed to small changes in the salary arbi-
tration system. The number of players eligible for arbitration increased to 17% of the
players with two years of experience, sorted by experience, but not yet three years of
experience. The roster size was also increased from 24 to 25, a win for the MLBPA.
There were no changes to pension funding or free agency, and the minimum salary
increased to $100,000 (Zimbalist, 2003b).
The CBA negotiations that were most contentious and perhaps received the most
media and public attention occurred from 1993 to 1995. These infamous negotiations
resulted in the cancellation of the 1994 World Series and a delay in the start of the 1995
season. Negotiations began in early 1993 when the owners voted 15-13 to reopen the
existing CBA early. However, little progress was made in negotiations throughout 1993
and the deal was to expire on December 3 of that year. The owners were pushing hard
for a salary cap to curb the growth of players’ salaries. Their chief negotiator, Dick
Ravitch, proposed a system that included both a salary cap and increased revenue shar-
ing to aid small-market teams and increase competitive balance. The MLBPA chief,
Donald Fehr, strongly opposed any system that would limit the amount an owner
could spend on player salaries but indicated that he would be open to discussion of the
issue if the owners opened their financial books and agreed to share more revenue.
However, Ravitch had a major problem; he could not obtain an agreement among his
owners on the issue of revenue sharing. Several big-market owners were against shar-
ing their revenue with the smaller, poorer teams. This led to a great deal of confusion
and a lack of unity on the side of ownership (Zimbalist, 2003b).
As stated earlier, little progress between the owners and MLBPA occurred from
January to July of 1993. Fehr started to believe that the owners’ talk of revenue shar-
ing was a delaying tactic since most of the owners’ network television revenue came at
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the end of the season, after the World Series. Fehr believed that the owners were
stalling. By doing this, the owners would have the ability to declare a bargaining
impasse at the end of the 1993 season. Once an impasse was declared, the owners could
then unilaterally impose their last offer as the CBA for the 1994 season. In hindsight,
Fehr was probably correct on his views of owner behavior. The first substantive pro-
posal by the owners to the MLBPA was not made until June 1994. It included a salary
cap based on a 50/50 split of revenues. At that time, the players’ salaries accounted for
about 56% of revenues, so a 50/50 split would cut greatly into player salaries. In addi-
tion, no team could spend more than 110% of the salary cap figure while no team
could also spend less than 84% of that amount. Under the owners’ proposal, the cap
was to be phased in over a four-year time period.
The owners also asked for the elimination of salary arbitration in exchange for play-
ers becoming free agents after four years of service. Lastly, the owners called for a 50/50
split of player licensing revenue; previously, the players kept 100% of this money. The
players proposed no changes to the licensing revenue system, maintenance of the
salary arbitration system that was in place, and a general desire to keep the status quo
from the previous agreement. Donald Fehr stated that owners’ proposals would cost
the players about $1.5 billion in lost wages and benefits over the deal’s seven years.
Similar to past negotiations, both sides worked hard to win public and media support
for their side of the argument (Zimbalist, 2003b).
With no agreement in sight, on July 28, 1994, the MLBPA set a strike date of August
12. The owners responded by refusing to make a scheduled payment into the players’
pension fund. The players’ response to this was to file an unfair labor practices suit.
The MLBPA went through with their threat and walked away from the ballparks in
August. After one month of the strike and with no end in the foreseeable future, new
MLB commissioner and Milwaukee Brewers owner Bud Selig cancelled the remainder
of the season, including the World Series, on September 14, 1994. It had been over a
century since no World Series had been played. The stalemate continued through the
fall of 1994. The situation became so dire that President Bill Clinton appointed a medi-
ator, William Usery, to the case. But Usery had little luck in forging an agreement and
in December 1994, the owners announced a bargaining impasse. Their plan was to
unilaterally impose the salary cap for the 1995 season. In response, the MLBPA filed
another unfair labor practices suit claiming that the talks were ongoing and no
impasse had occurred. By January 1995, the owners announced that they were pre-
pared to start the season with non-union players (Zimbalist, 2003b).
A break in the situation occurred in late March 1995, when the NLRB voted 3-2 in
favor of the MLBPA on their claim of unfair labor practices and the owners were not
permitted to invoke their new labor system for the 1995 season. Five days after that rul-
ing, it was upheld on appeal in the New York federal court of appeals. The judge, cur-
rent U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, issued an injunction that forced the
owners to restore all the terms of the previous CBA. At that point, the exhibition sea-
son had already begun with non-union players. The owners decided that it was too
risky to lock out the players and they went back to the ballparks under the previous
CBA. These events also kick-started negotiations between the two sides. The negotia-
tions went on during the 1995 season and eventually resulted in an agreement on a
new CBA in November 1995; though ratification of the CBA did not occur until the
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Table 4: Revenue Sharing Amounts, by Team, for 2002-2003
Team 2003 2002
Montreal $29,517,000 $28,493,994
Florida 21,030,000 20,946,573
Tampa Bay 20,464,000 14,724,463
Kansas City 19,042,000 16,629,872
Toronto 18,735,000 13,691,953
Minnesota 17,249,000 12,977,421
Detroit 16,738,000 11,615,688
Milwaukee 16,555,000 8,502,007
Pittsburgh 13,299,000 6,400,652
San Diego 13,250,000 6,283,572
Oakland 11,756,000 9,201,545
Philadelphia 9,013,000 9,834,124
Cincinnati 6,469,000 9,807,244
Colorado 2,469,000 (-5,127,222)
Anaheim 1,874,000 (-1,303,070)
Arizona 1,456,000 (-3,255,682)
Houston 1,182,000 (-4,326,392)
Baltimore 252,000 (-5,337,479)
Cleveland (-4,828,000) (-10,612,923)
Chicago White Sox (-4,833,000) (-3,823,142)
Texas (-7,162,000) (-8,205,165)
St. Louis (-9,202,000) (-8,385,888)
Los Angeles (-9,490,000) (-9,278,555)
Atlanta (-11,291,000) (-9,753,575)
San Francisco (-12,959,000) (-9,638,790)
Chicago Cubs (-16,731,000) (-8,280,260)
NY Mets (-21,473,000) (-17,366,067)
Seattle (-31,023,000) (-19,877,788)
Boston (-38,692,000) (-17,896,820)
NY Yankees (-52,650,000) (-26,640,289)
Total Transfer $220,350,000 $169,109,108 
Note: Amounts in parentheses are revenue payers, all other amounts are revenue
receivers.
Table 5: Selected Rvenue Sharing Amounts, by Year
Year Revenue Sharing Amounts
1996 $50 million
2002 $169 million
2003 $220 million
2005 $312 million
2006 $326 million
2009 $433 million
2010 $404 million
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spring of 1996. The new six-year agreement called for a revenue sharing system that
was phased in over the length of the CBA. Each team would be taxed 20% of their net
local revenue with three-quarters of the total tax money being split equally among all
teams. The remaining one-quarter would be distributed to the teams with below aver-
age revenue levels. In 2001, approximately $168 million was redistributed from large-
market to small-market teams through this revenue sharing plan (Zimbalist, 2003b).
Another important aspect of the agreement was the imposition of a competitive bal-
ance tax, commonly known as the luxury tax. Under the plan, a team would pay a tax
to the league if it spent over a designated amount on player salaries. The system was
first used for the 1997 season. For example, the top five payroll teams in 1997 paid a
35% tax on the amount of money they spent on salary over the midpoint of the fifth
and sixth highest payroll teams. So, if a team was $10 million over that amount, it paid
a tax of $3.5 million. The collected tax money was distributed to teams that did not
pay the tax. Another outcome of the 1995 CBA was a realization that small- and large-
market owners had increasingly divergent interests. In some ways, the rift between
large- and small-market owners had as much impact on the difficulty in getting a deal
done as the differences between players and owners.
The fallout from the 1994–95 strike has been greatly studied in academic literature.
Staudohar (2000) reported that average game attendance fell by over 20% from early
1994 to 1995 and that owners reported losses of over $1 billion from the cancelled
games. In comparison, Schmidt and Berri (2002, 2004) concluded that the impact was
actually about a 35% drop in attendance, but that it recovered quickly in subsequent
seasons. Coates and Harrison (2005) found that the strike had about a 24% impact on
attendance, but it also recovered by the next season. The 1981 and 1972 strikes result-
ed in losses of about 10-12%, and even previous work stoppages that did not result in
missed regular or postseason games had negative impacts on attendance of between
3–7% according to Coates and Harrison (2005). On the other hand, Matheson (2006)
showed that once the positive impact of new stadiums was accounted for, baseball
attendance from 1995 to 2003 continued to remain lower than pre-1994 levels.
The CBA negotiations that followed the lost World Series were amicable in compar-
ison to 1995. The next round of discussions began in 2001 as the 1995 deal was near-
ing expiration. An important aspect of these negotiations was that they occurred
shortly after the MLB owners and Selig published the findings of their Blue Ribbon
panel in July 2000. The panel, comprised of 12 owners and four outside experts, was
asked to study MLB’s economic system and to make recommendations for improve-
ment of the game in areas such as competitive balance. No player input was asked for
with respect to the Blue Ribbon panel. The panel made several recommendations such
as increased revenue sharing, a more restrictive luxury tax system, and changes to the
amateur draft. In part, the panel and its findings appeared to be a strategy by the own-
ers to set the parameters for their bargaining position going into the 2001 negotiations.
The negotiations began rather slowly, with no talks beginning until the spring of
2001. Selig’s strategy appeared to be a delay in substantive talks in an effort to improve
the owners’ bargaining power. Selig did not attend any bargaining sessions until
January 2002; two months after the previous deal expired. In November 2001, no for-
mal offers had been made by the owners and in a surprise move right after the World
Series, Selig announced, with no prior signal to the MLBPA, a plan to contract two
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teams and thus eliminate 50 Major League roster spots. Noll (2003) calculated that $1
billion would accrue to the rest of the teams in MLB as a result of contracting the two
weakest teams. He noted that the incentives to contract teams increased with more rev-
enue sharing. Without revenue sharing, a weak team must stand on its own, but with
revenue sharing the strongest clubs ultimately subsidize the weakest ones.
The owners’ first formal proposal in January 2002, included many ideas presented
in the Blue Ribbon panel report such as amateur draft changes; along with new ideas
such as contraction, the right for a franchise to release a player if it believed the salary
arbitration figure determined by the impartial arbitrator was too high, a call for high-
salary teams to pay more into the pension fund than low-salary teams, and, of course,
a salary cap. The MLBPA believed, and rightly so, that the owners’ proposals were an
attempt to reduce future player salaries. For example, a team would perhaps be less
willing to increase their payroll if it must also pay more into the players’ pension fund
by doing so.
This initial proposal was coldly received by the MLBPA. The union believed that the
owners’ tough demands were nothing more than a bargaining ploy. By asking for sig-
nificant changes, the owners knew that they would not get them all. If they only got a
portion of these demands, the owners would be quite happy with the agreement. In
the end, it turned out that the owners got almost none of their proposed changes to
the CBA. In mid-August, the MLBPA set a strike date of August 30, 2002. An agree-
ment was reached between the players and owners on the afternoon of that day; just a
few hours before games were to be played. In stark contrast to 1994–95, no strike
occurred and no games were lost. It was the first time in over two decades that no work
stoppage occurred as a result of stalled CBA negotiations. It appeared that both sides
had learned their lesson from 1995 and did not want to suffer the financial and pub-
lic relations damage from a work stoppage. These negotiations also occurred less than
a year after the 9/11 tragedy, in which MLB played a very public role in helping the cit-
izens of the United States heal. Following the burst of the technology bubble, it was
also a time when the American economy was rather weak (Zimbalist, 2003b).
The new four-year agreement was similar to the prior deal with the exception of a
few changes. The minimum player salary was increased 50% to $300,000 and more
revenue was shared among owners. The new plan called for 34% of net local revenues
to be shared across teams. This resulted in $229 million to $258 million being shared
annually over the course of the deal. Table 4 provides data on the amount of revenue
that was paid or received by each team for 2002 and 2003, and Table 5 shows the total
amount of revenue that was shared across selected years. Additionally, the players’ ben-
efit fund was increased and plans were made for the initiation of a drug testing pro-
gram for steroids. Another area that was changed by the new deal was the competitive
balance tax, also known as the luxury tax. Under the prior deal, the tax only affected
the top five payroll teams, and it appeared that the luxury tax had little effect on
salaries over the course of the deal, so it was eliminated entirely for the 2000–2002 sea-
sons (Zimbalist, 2003b).
Under the new agreement, the rule that the top five payroll teams pay the tax was
eliminated. In its place, payroll thresholds were established, and any team that sur-
passed the threshold level was required to pay a percentage tax on the amount of over-
age. The threshold was set at $117 million for 2003, and it escalated each year until it
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was up to $136 million for the final year, 2006. The tax rate was 17.5% for first offend-
ers, 30% for second offenders immediately after the first offense, and 40% thereafter for
consecutive offenders (Zimbalist, 2003a). In retrospect, the luxury tax did little to curb
rising team salaries. Most teams did not have the financial ability to go over the high tax
thresholds and those that did, such as the New York Yankees, could afford to pay the tax.
Table 6 displays the teams and amounts paid in luxury tax from 1997 to 1999 and 2003
to 2011. As stated earlier, no luxury tax system was implemented from 2000 to 2002.
After receiving a great deal of attention after Commissioner Selig’s public statements on
the matter, contraction was ultimately set aside. Somewhat ironically, as revenue shar-
ing continued to increase, the incentives for contraction grew. However, to this day it
still remains dormant. Covington (2003) noted that the issue of whether the owners
must bargain over contraction or can act unilaterally is still undecided.
An important result of the revenue sharing plan that began in 1997 and was extend-
ed in the 2003 agreement was that it actually made competitive balance worse accord-
ing to Maxcy (2009) and Zimbalist (2003a). As smaller market teams produced more
revenue, they received less revenue from the sharing plan. Thus, their incentives to
invest in higher revenue producing assets, like better players, was reduced, leaving them
with the highest marginal tax rate within the revenue sharing system. Zimbalist (2003a)
calculated that the marginal tax rate for low revenue producing teams was about 41%
at the end of the 1997 agreement. It increased to about 47% with the 2003 CBA.
Individual case studies of teams (as reported by the media; see Bloom, 2006a; Dosh,
2007; Kovacevic, 2005; Snel, 2005; Weir, 2002) found that some teams appeared to be
simply pocketing the money received from revenue sharing. For example, the Pirates,
Expos, and Brewers lowered their player payrolls after receiving increases in revenue
sharing payments. The CBA required owners to spend the money on improving their
performance on the field, but that does not mean that the teams’ payrolls had to
increase from the year before. Given that money in this case is fungible, owners could
do what they wanted with their revenue sharing allotment. In fact, some of the small-
market owners are notable billionaires and if they thought that investing more money
in players would increase their profits or utility, they certainly could do so without
relying on MLB’s revenue sharing money. Therefore, it is not surprising that some rev-
enue-sharing recipients choose to spend that money elsewhere and not on player pay-
roll.
Interestingly, at the time neither side foresaw that the most controversial topic that
was discussed in this round of negotiations was steroid use and the testing for per-
formance-enhancing drugs (PEDs). It was a short time after this agreement was signed
that PED use in MLB became a national issue when the BALCO controversy brought
national media attention to players such as Barry Bonds.
In October 2006, Selig and Fehr held a press conference to announce that a new CBA
had been agreed upon. At five years in length, it was the longest deal ever agreed upon
by the two sides. The negotiations occurred with little public bickering and fanfare. At
the time, MLB was on firm financial footing with league revenues and player salaries
being at all-time highs. The U.S. economy was booming, and corporations and media
outlets were spending on MLB, while attendance numbers were also increasing. In
short, both sides were happy and this made for easy negotiations. A minor change was
made to the luxury tax system with higher payroll thresholds going into effect; by
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2011, the threshold was $178 million. While the old CBA had not been reopened
between 2002 and 2006, the drug testing portion of it was changed, with the agreement
of both sides, in the wake of the steroid scandal. Testing was increased and stiffer
penalties were invoked. These provisions were extended through the 2006 deal and an
agreement was reached to discuss mandatory testing for human growth hormones
(Bloom, 2006b). The drug testing program was bilaterally stiffened again in 2008 by
the MLBPA and owners.
The New Deal and Changes From the 2006 MLB CBA
There were several changes made to the MLB collective bargaining agreement in 2011.
Three of these changes directly dealt with the nature of the game itself. First, the two
sides agreed to add a second Wild Card team in both the American and National
Leagues. Under the new format, each division winner along with the two teams with
the best winning percentage in their league, the so-called Wild Card teams, qualify for
the postseason. The two Wild Card teams will have a one-game playoff to determine
who will advance to the league divisional series. The goal of this change was to increase
the number of playoff games and to keep more teams in the late-season race for the
playoffs. Some research has shown that fans want more playoff games and an increase
in the likelihood of teams reaching the post-season. This new format may also lead to
an increase in television revenues with two additional postseason games being played
(O’Reilly, 2011). This should have a slight positive effect on lowering the dispersion of
revenues across franchises as more teams vie for the playoffs.
Second, the new CBA also calls for an equal number of teams in both leagues. As of
the 2012 season, the National League had 16 teams while the American League had 14
members. Under the new CBA, the Houston Astros will move from the NL to the AL
in 2013 to create two leagues of 15. Third, along with this move, the number of
intraleague games played between NL and AL teams will increase in the future and will
be played throughout the season (“Summary,” 2011). In the past, there have been cer-
tain segments of the season where intraleague games were played. The continuous
playing of intraleague games must occur with an odd number of teams in each league.
The CBA also resulted in relatively minor changes in the revenue sharing system.
Under the 2006 CBA, approximately $325–350 million was transferred from the large-
revenue clubs to small-revenue clubs. This level of revenue transfer will continue in the
future, with growth in transfers coming if league revenues grow and the disparity
between small and large revenue teams widens. Thirty-one percent of net local rev-
enues will be shared, plus additional central revenues, and re-distributed based on
market potential. Recipients must have payrolls that are 25% greater than the revenue
sharing funds received, and they must document that the money is not spent on debt
reduction, but to improve their team. This will help deter recipient teams from pock-
eting the money, which should improve competitive balance substantially, to the
extent that this is enforceable.
One change that was made is that the new CBA states that by 2016, the 15 teams in
the largest markets will be disqualified from revenue-sharing (“Summary,” 2011).
Thus, those teams in large markets that fail to generate the larger revenues will no
longer have the ability to be revenue-sharing recipients. This rule penalizes large-mar-
ket clubs that fail to generate revenues that would place them in the top half of the
Volume 7 • Number 2 • 2012 • IJSF 193
Recent Collective Bargaining in Major League Baseball
league. There is no provision allowing teams in shared markets to potentially be rev-
enue-sharing recipients. Another provision of the new CBA was that the
Commissioner’s Discretionary Fund was increased from $10 million to $15 million.
This is a pool of money that can be distributed to different clubs based on the decision
of the Commissioner’s office and has been traditionally given to small-market clubs
(“Summary,” 2011).
Another change in the new CBA was in the dollar amounts for the competitive bal-
ance (luxury) tax. The team salary threshold level of $178 million will be unchanged
for the 2012 and 2013 seasons. However, it will increase to $189 million for the 2014,
2015, and 2016 seasons. The tax rate for first-time offenders will drop from 22.5% to
17.5%, but it will increase from 40% to 50% when a team goes over the cap number
for the fourth time. The rates will remain the same, 30% and 40% for second and third
offenders, respectively (“Summary,” 2011). Given the MLBPA’s opposition to any type
of luxury tax or salary cap, this appears to be a compromise for both sides. While new
offenders will pay a smaller penalty for going over the tax amount, perpetual repeat
offenders such as the New York Yankees will pay a steeper price. These changes should
have a minimal effect on competitive balance given that they are a relatively small devi-
ation from the prior CBA. Moreover, the tax revenues will not go directly to small-
market teams, but to general industry growth. The impact on competitive balance
comes from taxing high-spending clubs and thus reducing their expenditures—not
from re-allocating that money to small market clubs.
An adjustment was also made to the salary arbitration system. The number of two-
year players who are eligible for arbitration went from the top 17% to the top 22%,
based on service time (“Summary,” 2011). More second-year players will now be eligi-
ble to apply for salary arbitration if they cannot agree on a new contract with their
team. This may have a long-term effect of increasing player salaries since we have seen
arbitration positively influence salaries over the past four decades. However, similar to
the adjustment in the luxury tax, this provision is a relatively minor change from the
prior CBA and may perhaps have little, if any, long-term effect on player salaries.
Another change that will directly affect player salaries is an increase in the minimum
salary. The minimum salary will rise to $480,000 in 2012, a $69,000 increase from 2011.
It will increase to $500,000 by 2014, and cost-of-living adjustments will occur for 2015
and 2016 (“Summary,” 2011). These changes will benefit the players, though they may
negatively impact low-revenue teams that often have more players under the reserve
clause versus large-market teams. If the new minimum salary has a greater impact on
low-revenue teams, that may also then affect competitive balance across MLB.
A few minor changes were made to the free agency system as a result of the new
CBA. The changes primarily deal with draft pick compensation for teams that lose
players via free agency. Previously, MLB had a system in place where players were des-
ignated as Type A or Type B free agents based on performance with the amount of
compensation for the team that lost the player based on that player’s designation. For
example, if a team lost a Type B player, it would receive an additional amateur draft
pick that would occur between the first and second rounds, known as a “sandwich”
pick. This system has been altered with the new CBA. Under the new deal, a team is
only available for compensation if the player they lost via free agency was with their
team for the entirety of the previous season. So, if a player who was in the last year of
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their contract is traded in July, which has been quite common, the team that acquires
the player is not eligible for compensation if they lose the player via free agency.
Additionally, a player will only be subject to compensation if his prior team made him
an offer of a minimum one-year guaranteed contract with a salary equal to the aver-
age salary of the top 125 highest-paid players from the prior season. This rule takes the
place of the Type A/B free agent designations. If a player meets the requirements for
compensation, the team that loses that player will still receive an additional pick
between the first and second rounds of the amateur draft, as it did under the prior
CBA (“Summary,” 2011).
The amateur draft was amended in several other areas. The draft has been and will
continue to be held annually in June. However, the deadline by which draftees must be
signed by their club will be moved from August 15 to between July 12 and July 18, pos-
sibly forcing the drafted players to sign earlier and get them onto minor league rosters.
One issue that has been raised in recent years has been the amount of money that
teams have spent on signing bonuses for top draft picks. The numbers have grown rap-
idly over the past decade. In the past several years, players such as Bryce Harper,
Stephen Strasburg, and Jamison Taillon have received signing bonuses in excess of $6
million. In comparison, the top signing bonus in 1996 was about $2 million. In
response to increasing signing bonuses, the new CBA institutes a signing bonus pool
system in which each team will be allocated an amount of money for the signing of all
their draftees within the first 10 rounds. The amount of money that each team will be
allocated for these signing bonuses will be based on the quantity and position of the
team’s picks. Dollar values are assigned to the draft picks and any player taken after the
first 10 rounds will not count toward the signing pool amount unless the player
receives a bonus in excess of $100,000. If a team goes over their bonus pool amount by
0–5%, it will pay a 75% tax on the overage. That amount increases to a 100% tax if the
team is over the pool amount by 10% or more. The actual dollar amounts of the sign-
ing bonus pools were not enumerated in the CBA. Additionally, a team may also lose
future draft picks if it is more than five percent over its pool amount. The money gen-
erated from the signing bonus pool will be redistributed to teams that do not exceed
their bonus pool cap, and any lost draft picks will be assigned to those teams through
a lottery. The lottery will be weighted toward those teams with the lowest winning per-
centage and/or smallest revenues in the previous season (“Summary,” 2011).
Another change to the amateur draft is that teams with the lowest revenues and the
smallest markets will have the opportunity to obtain additional draft picks.
Historically, draft order was based on the winning percentages of the teams. The goal
of this new provision is to aid the poorer teams in improving on-field quality. These
additional picks should help the small-market teams put a better product on the field.
Under the new system, the 10 clubs with the lowest revenues and the 10 clubs with the
smallest markets will be entered into a lottery for six picks that will occur after com-
pletion of the first round. The lottery is weighted toward those teams with the lowest
winning percentage in the previous season. Also, those clubs that do not obtain a pick
through this lottery, along with the clubs who make payments under the revenue shar-
ing plan, will be entered into a second lottery for six picks at the conclusion of the sec-
ond round. This lottery will be weighted based on previous season winning percentage
(“Summary,” 2011). Again, the goal of this CBA provision is to aid small-market teams
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Table 7: Collective Bargaining Agreements Across Leagues, 2012
CBA Component MLB NFL NBA NHL
Length of Deal
Teams in 
Postseason
Revenue Sharing
Luxury Tax
5 years (2012-
16)
10 of 30 teams
31% of net local
revenues are
shared plus
additional cen-
tral revenues
and re-distrib-
uted based on
market poten-
tial. Recipients
must have pay-
rolls 25%
greater than
revenue sharing
funds received.
Must document
that it’s not
spent on debt
reduction, but
to improve
team.
Payrolls over
$178 million are
subject to a tax
that escalates
depending on
how many
times in a row a
team exceeds
the threshold.
Tax revenues go
to industry
growth initia-
tives.
5 years, but
optioned for 1
more (2006-7
through 2011-
12 season)
16 of 30 teams
Lower-revenue
and small mar-
ket clubs will
receive revenue
from central
fund and
directly from 10
highest revenue
clubs
None
10 years (2011-
2020), mutual
opt-out after 6.
16 of 30 teams
50% of a team’s
revenue minus
certain expenses
will be thrown
into a revenue
sharing pot.
Teams with
most need
receive up to
$16 million per
year. Total pot
should be about
$200 million by
2013-14 season.
Escalating luxu-
ry tax paid for
payrolls above
the salary cap.
Escalation
occurs based on
amount above
the cap and
whether team
continuously
goes above the
cap.
10 years (2011-
2020)
12 of 30 teams
League national
revenues dis-
tributed evenly.
Portion of tick-
et sales shared
evenly. Other
Team revenues
partially redis-
tributed from
top earning
clubs to low
earning clubs
who meet spe-
cific spending
requirements.
None because
there is a hard
salary cap
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Table 7: Collective Bargaining Agreements Across Leagues, 2012, continued
CBA Component MLB NFL NBA NHL
Salary Cap/
Minimum
Individual Player 
Salary Minimum 
& Maximum
No salary cap or
team minimum.
Players earned
51% of league
revenues in
2007.
Minimum is
$480,000 in
2012. There is
no maximum.
Players will
receive 54-57%
of defined rev-
enues (escalat-
ing as league
revenues rise).
$64.3 million in
2011-12.
$525,000 mini-
mum in 2011-
12. No player
can earn more
than 20% of
team salary cap.
Soft cap with
many excep-
tions. Players
receive between
49-51% of
defined rev-
enues. Team
minimum is
80% of cap in
2011-12, 85%
in 2012-13,
90% thereafter.
Level in 2011-
12 is same as
2010-11 ($58
million), but
pro-rated for
shortened sea-
son.
Minimum
ranges from
$473,604 for
rookies to
$1,352,181 for
veterans with
10+ years of
service for
2010-11. Players
can sign for up
to 35% of team
salary cap or
105% of previ-
ous year’s
salary, whichev-
er is higher.
Hard cap of
$120.375M (+
$22.025M of
player benefits)
in 2011, grow-
ing annually
with revenues.
League mini-
mum in 2011
and 2012, Team
minimum in 4
year blocks
2013-2016 and
2017-2020.
Total Player
Comp = 55% of
projected
League Media
Revenue + 45%
of projected
NFL Ventures
Revenue + 40%
of projected
Local Revenue
+ if applicable,
50% of the net
AR for new line
of business
projects less
47.5% of the
Joint
Contribution
Amount
Minimum
ranges from
$375,000 for
rookies to
$910,000 for
veterans with
10+ years of
service for 2011.
Levels increase
by $15,000 each
year.
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Table 7: Collective Bargaining Agreements Across Leagues, 2012, continued
CBA Component MLB NFL NBA NHL
Free Agency
Salary Arbitration
Draft Restrictions
Debt Service Rule
Players with 6
or more years
of service (in
40-man roster)
are eligible for
free agency.
Draft pick com-
pensation for
previous club.
Top 22% of
players with
two years of
service are eligi-
ble for salary
arbitration
Reverse-order
draft plus addi-
tional CB
enhancements.
International
players are free
agents. Teams
have a total sum
of money for
signing bonuses
Maximum debt
is 8*EBITDA
(12*EBITDA
for teams with
new stadiums)
Players 27 years
or older (with 4
accrued sea-
sons), or players
with 7 accrued
seasons will be
unrestricted
free agents.
Restricted FAs
are subject to
right of first
refusal and
draft pick com-
pensation for
prior club.
After 4 years in
the league, play-
ers are eligible
for salary arbi-
tration.
Reverse-order
weighted draft.
Free agent and
other draft pick
compensation.
Min. 18 years of
age.
None
Players are free
agents at termi-
nation of con-
tract. Certain
players are sub-
ject to restricted
free agency. No
compensation
for teams that
lose free agents.
None
Two rounds;
same order in
both rounds.
No compensa-
tory picks.
Extensive eligi-
bility rules.
None
Players with 4
or more
accrued seasons
become unre-
stricted free
agents at end of
their contract.
Players with 3
accrued seasons
can be retained
as restricted free
agents (draft
pick compensa-
tion for prior
club). 
None
Seven rounds
(reverse order
of finish) plus
compensatory
picks at end of
rounds 3-7
based on unre-
stricted free
agents lost in
prior year.
Eligibility
requires being 3
years removed
from high
school.
General debt
ceiling of $150
million with
waivers possi-
ble. Separate
rules for G-3
loan.
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and provide more competitive balance to MLB, an area that has received a great deal
of attention from owners, media, and fans over the past decade.
Another area of discussion in recent years for MLB has been the acquisition of inter-
national talent. Historically, players coming from nations such as Taiwan and Japan
have not been included in the June Amateur Draft. Once eligible to play in MLB, they
have been considered free agents, and this has led to bidding wars amongst teams for
talented international players such as Daisuke Matsuzaka (Dice-K) and Yu Darvish. In
the case of Dice-K, the Boston Red Sox paid $51 million to his Japanese professional
team for the right to negotiate a contract with him over a 30-day period. The Red Sox
eventually gave Dice-K a six-year, $52 million contract. So, ultimately, it cost Boston
over $100 million to acquire Matsuzaka. Due to these high contract amounts for inter-
national star players, most of them have signed with high-revenue, big-market teams
such as the Red Sox, Yankees, Cubs, and Dodgers. Many small-market teams have been
highly critical of this system and have demanded changes.
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Table 7: Collective Bargaining Agreements Across Leagues, 2012, continued
CBA Component MLB NFL NBA NHL
Rookie 
Compensation
Squad Size
Guaranteed 
Contracts
No maximum
for rookie MLB
players
25 players until
Sept. 1, then 40
players
100% of
remaining value
is guaranteed
$925,000 plus
substantial
bonuses.
Younger players
stay under these
Entry Level
contracts for
longer before
becoming arbi-
tration eligible.
23 players on
active roster (20
eligible to play
per game)
1/3 of remain-
ing salary, if less
than 28 years
old; 2/3 of
remaining value
if over 28.
Rookie salary
scale in place
for 1st round
picks (covering
first 2-4 years).
Cap for first
pick is $4.3 mil-
lion in 2011-12
(pro-rated).
15 maximum,
13 minimum.
Certain salary
must be guar-
anteed. Rest is a
matter of nego-
tiation. In prac-
tice, the
majority of
NBA contracts
are fully guar-
anteed.
Each team has a
Maximum 1st
year allotment
based on draft
slots and each
player has a
minimum 1st
year comp so
contracts must
be negotiated
within set
parameters. 5
year contracts
for 1st round, 4
years for 2nd-
7th rounds, 3
years for
undrafted.
53 in season (46
active for
games), 80 in
off-season
Negotiated.
Outside of 1st
round draft
picks contracts
are almost
never fully
guaranteed.
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Table 7: Collective Bargaining Agreements Across Leagues, 2012, continued
CBA Component MLB NFL NBA NHL
Drug Testing 
Head Injury 
Program
Note: CB is competitive balance; PES is Performance Enhancing Substance.
Sources: Larry Coon at cbafaq.com provided some of the information for the NBA; Brian
Hampton, Director of Football Administration, San Francisco 49ers, provided some of the
information for the NFL; CBAs for each league.
PES testing
(incl. HGH)
throughout
2012 season for
reasonable
cause. First
offense is 50-
game suspen-
sion.
Improved upon
2011 concus-
sion policy
(specifics not
yet available)
PES testing
twice per year,
with 20-game
suspension for
first offense.
Player removed
from game and
tested after each
possible inci-
dent.
Players subject
to random test-
ing during the
pre-season peri-
od (no HGH),
rookies are sub-
ject to random
testing three
times during
the regular sea-
son, and all
players are sub-
ject to testing
for reasonable
causes at any
time. Steroids
were added to
the list of
banned sub-
stances in 1999.
First offense is a
10-game sus-
pension.
Players diag-
nosed with con-
cussion go
through series
of escalating
tests. Then, just
remain asymp-
tomatic for 24
hours. May miss
days or weeks.
Increasing dis-
cipline for
failed or diluted
tests. More fre-
quent tests for
those who have
failed a prior
test.
Player with
concussion
symptoms is
removed for
remainder of
game and can-
not return to
practice or play
until he passes
strict testing
requirements
The 2011 CBA is the first to formally address the amount of money spent on inter-
national talent. Similar to the Amateur Draft Signing Bonus Pool, a signing bonus pool
has been established for international talent. For the post-2012 season signing period,
each team will be assigned an equal signing bonus pool amount. In later seasons, the
amount for each team will be determined based on winning percentage in the previ-
ous season. The team with the lowest winning percentage will have the largest pool
amount. A team will pay a tax, ranging from 75% to 100%, on the amount of overage
over their designated signing pool amount that the team spends to acquire interna-
tional talent (“Summary,” 2011).
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Since the 2002 CBA, there has been a debt service rule in MLB in effect to curb the
accrual of high levels of debt by team owners. Under the old agreement, a team’s debt
was limited to 10 times their level of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization (EBITDA). One exception to this rule was that teams with new or reno-
vated ballparks could have debt up to 15 times their EBITDA. The 2011 CBA reduces
these levels to eight times EBITDA for clubs, and 12 times EBITDA for clubs in new or
renovated ballparks.
With respect to the players’ benefit and pension plans, the new CBA continues to
give the players the maximum pension benefit that is allowable under IRS rules.
Currently, the club owners make an annual contribution of approximately $184.5 mil-
lion to the players’ pension fund. Some minor improvements to the pension and life
insurance benefits of certain classes of retired players and their widows were made,
while the waiting period for life insurance and disability insurance was eliminated for
some active players. Access to health insurance has also been improved for internation-
al players and their families (“Summary,” 2011).
Several changes have been made under the new CBA with respect to the safety and
health of players, coaches, and managers. First, the use of smokeless tobacco, an
accepted product in baseball for decades, will be prohibited during televised interviews
and team appearances. Additionally, any time that fans are permitted into the ballpark,
all containers for smokeless tobacco must be concealed. Violators are subject to disci-
pline and both parties agreed to participate in educational programs and community
outreach to publicize the danger of smokeless tobacco products. Both parties also
agreed to a program of mandatory evaluation by a trained professional for players who
are suspected of alcohol use problems. This includes players who are arrested for driv-
ing while intoxicated and for players arrested for crimes involving the use of violence
(“Summary,” 2011).
Lastly, the drug testing program that was enacted in 2008 after the steroid scandal
will remain in effect. One new component of the program is that beginning with the
2012 Spring Training, all players are given a blood test for human growth hormone
(HGH). Additionally, players may undergo random HGH tests at any time during the
year if reasonable cause exists. Beginning in 2013, all players will be subject to random,
unannounced testing for HGH.
Comparison of 2011 CBA Negotiations in MLB to NFL, NBA, and NHL
A key result of the new CBAs in football, basketball, and baseball, and the NHL’s cur-
rent CBA that ends in 2012, is the convergence of player pay toward 50% of total
league revenues. NBA players’ salaries came down in their recent CBA from 57% to a
range between 49–51% of basketball-related income (see Berri, pp. 158-175 of this
journal issue). The salary cap in the NFL went from 57% of total revenue (TR) in 2006
to the current level, which is capped at 48% in 2012 (Zimbalist, 2010; Singer-Vine,
2011; see Quinn, pp. 141-157 of this journal issue). Yet, since the cap allows for excep-
tions, Zimbalist calculated that NFL players actually received about 58.4% of TR in
2006. In the NHL, players currently receive between 54–57% of hockey-related rev-
enue.1 See Table 7 for a comparison of key provisions of the Big 4’s CBAs and side
agreements. While a revenue split of 50% should not be a magical number, Billy
Hunter of the NBPA noted in public that he thought the players deserved more than
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the owners simply because they were the ones playing the game and generating the
revenues (Beck, 2011). In that context, 50% is very meaningful.
In MLB, the percentage of total revenues that players receive has been more volatile
over the years, likely because there is no cap to tether player salaries directly to league
revenue. From a peak of 67% in 2002, it went down to about 51% in 2007. Zimbalist
(2010) noted that over 6% of MLB’s revenues go toward paying minor league players,
and some of the cost of acquiring players in MLB from overseas goes to the overseas
club and not to the player. For example, about half of Matsuzaka’s $103 million cost
went to his former club in Japan. Also, while no salary cap exists in MLB as it does in
the NFL, NBA, and NHL, the luxury tax and revenue sharing plan act as a drag on
players’ salaries. The data described above bear this out, as there has been an increase
in revenue sharing and luxury taxes paid over the past decade in MLB. This may also
be true of the provisions for draft pick compensation and draft signing pools under
the new CBA.
Interestingly, the owners offered a team payroll floor of about $40 million in the
2002 bargaining session as an alternative to the enhanced revenue sharing system. The
goal was to help improve competitive balance, especially since it is possible for revenue
sharing recipients to avoid using the revenue sharing money to directly improve the
quality of play on the field, but a team salary minimum could not be avoided. The
players rejected this option because they did not want it to be the first step toward a
team salary cap, and the $40 million was close to the lowest team payrolls at the time
anyway (Zimbalist, 2010).
How did MLB avoid the pitfalls of lockouts and lawsuits that plagued the NFL and
NBA negotiations? Before answering that question, a result of less contention is less
media coverage. Evidence showing that the MLB negotiations were either less con-
tentious or less public, or both, comes from an examination of media coverage. A
search on the New York Times website for the six months leading up to the deals’ being
reached for the NFL, NBA, and MLB found 82 articles for the NFL, 13 for the NBA,
and two for MLB. The following search terms were used: “NFL collective bargaining,”
“NBA collective bargaining,” and “MLB collective bargaining.”2 On Google.com, a
search using the same timeframe and search terms yielded 72,200 hits for the NBA;
70,800 for the NBA; and 40,800 for MLB.
Revenues in MLB have been growing substantially, up 30% since the last CBA was
negotiated in 2006, partially due to the aggressive growth pursued by MLB Advanced
Media utilizing non-traditional sports league revenue streams. This growth has
undoubtedly helped make the negotiations in MLB less antagonistic. Second, MLB has
had the longest history of problematic CBA negotiations, with the result being missed
games and post-season cancellation. As noted by Matheson (2006), this has had a true
negative and lasting impact on attendance. Both sides seem to realize this and worked
hard to avoid a work stoppage in 2011. Third, the purposeful act of staying out of the
media has made the controversies within the negotiations private. The leaders have
been successful in keeping their respective constituents quiet. Fourth, the absence of a
salary cap in MLB means that a team, if it desires, can spend as much as it wants, sub-
ject to a luxury tax, on players’ compensation. Thus, the amount that players will
receive from a new CBA is uncertain and that uncertainty may actually help lead to
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agreement. In the other leagues, a salary cap is the key negotiating point because it is
directly tied to player pay, almost dollar for dollar.
How do the CBAs differ across the major professional North American sports
leagues? As noted by Vrooman (2009): “As recent power conflicts have been resolved,
the various collective bargaining solutions are becoming remarkably similar.” MLB’s
deal is the shortest at five years, while the NFL’s is the longest. With a hard salary cap
in place, the NFL can achieve more certainty in terms of expenses versus revenues
regardless of if the league grows quickly over the next decade. In MLB, since player
payroll is untethered from revenues, one of the sides may feel that it is losing a lot after
half of a decade. The NFL still shares the most revenue due to the substantially larger
national media deal, but both MLB and the NBA have increased their revenue sharing
and specifically push money down to lower-revenue teams as opposed to equally shar-
ing a larger sum of money. Also, MLB and the NBA have a luxury tax in place that pun-
ishes teams spending above a certain level: the soft salary cap in the NBA and luxury
tax payroll thresholds in MLB.
As mentioned elsewhere, MLB stands alone with no salary cap and a high luxury tax
threshold; it will be $178 million in 2012. However, the increased revenue sharing
should lower the incentive to pay more for players. The tightening of the enforcement
of having recipient teams spend that money will help offset those incentives and get
lower-revenue teams to spend more on players instead of pocketing the money. On bal-
ance, MLB still has the most restrictive free agency rules at six years of MLB service. The
NHL is between four and seven years of service, depending on the age of the player,
with both the NFL and NBA granting free agency to players with three to four years in
their respective league when their contract expires. However, MLB does have salary
arbitration available for players with two to three years of service. In comparison, the
NHL grants salary arbitration after four years of service. In general, arbitration raises
MLB salaries to levels between the reserve clause and free agent pay, all else equal.
Interesting changes to MLB’s draft policies have made the draft more beneficial to
lower-revenue teams by providing more picks and lowering the cost of signing bonus-
es. Given that drafted players in baseball do not enter MLB immediately, but play in
the minors, the impact of the draft on MLB club team quality has always been less
direct and certain. The new rules help compensate for that lack of parity due to the
draft, but still not as much as reverse-order drafts in the other sports, where the play-
ers immediately play in the top league.
MLB still does not have rookie pay caps, unlike the other leagues, but has capped
signing bonuses, and the players stay under the reserve clause longer than in other
leagues. One could imagine rookie salary caps in MLB as a future negotiating point for
MLB owners and current players given that rookies will not be at the bargaining table
to fight for their own rights. MLB still has more pay guaranteed, by far, than the other
leagues with the NHL next and the NFL last.
Collective bargaining in MLB is atypical when compared to union negotiations in
other non-sport industries. The next section will address some of these structural dif-
ferences, such as the relative leverage of both sides, typical negotiating timetables, and
bargaining techniques.
Comparison of MLB Bargaining Context to Non-Sports Industries
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Unlike the recent bargaining in the NBA and NFL, MLB’s bargaining for the 2011 deal
was very quiet. As stated earlier, this was also true of the 2006 MLB bargaining process.
There may be several reasons for the relative lack of media attention to both deals, but
the most important is probably the moratoriums that were placed on the two sides by
both Commissioner Selig and the head of the MLBPA, Donald Fehr in 2006 and
Michael Weiner in 2011. This kept the bargaining at the table and out of the headlines.
Given the public nature of bargaining in the NFL and NBA, and the relatively calm
MLB negotiations of 2006, it is not clear that the economic recession was actually a
factor in MLB’s negotiations.
Historically, what has made labor relations in MLB so turbulent? Covington (2003)
noted that three bodies of law play a role in MLB labor relations. First, antitrust laws
have been available to players since the 1998 passage of the Curt Flood Act, which
repealed the antitrust exemption solely as it relates to owner/player relations. Second,
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) governs collective bargaining between the
players’ union and the owners. However, it often lacks the teeth to be able to force
quick solutions. Instead, both sides negotiate in circles until a crisis develops, such as
the cancellation of regular-season or post-season games. After Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc. (1996), players can only pursue relief via the antitrust laws if they choose to not
pursue relief through formal collective bargaining. In other words, they have to choose
one or the other. Hence, we recently saw the decision by NBA players to disband their
union and file an antitrust lawsuit. Third, the Taft-Hartley Act (1947) pushes for arbi-
tration to resolve disputes, which has been used in professional baseball to resolve
issues. Examples of this are the Messersmith and McNally arbitrations that opened the
door to free agency.
There are several factors related to the structure of the players’ union that affect the
bargaining process. For example, the MLBPA cannot bargain for those players who are
not in the union. However, as Gould (2011) notes, the NLRA defines “employee” in a
broad enough sense to allow the MLB CBA to create draft rules, for instance, which
involve amateur players. The MLBPA is also exclusive and a “closed shop” in that it rep-
resents all players and all players must join the union. Perhaps the biggest historical
impediment to successful labor union negotiations has been the lack of trust by the
players with respect to the amount that the owners could afford to pay. The players
have asked the courts to force the teams to open their books, and the courts have con-
tinually denied this request (Silverman v. MLBPRC, 1981). In 2011, the NFL Players
Association was only able to get minimal financial data, mostly on the revenue side,
from the NFL owners during their negotiations.
Comparison to Traditional American Unions
Traditional labor/management bargaining situations in the U.S. involved unskilled or
low-skilled workers, with more highly skilled workers unionizing at a later date.
Typically, workers attempted to achieve control over their work conditions including
hours, pay, safety, and tasks (Rainsberger, 2009). As stated previously, in its early days
the MLBPA was primarily focused on issues related to pension funding, increasing the
minimum salary, bringing an end to the reserve clause, and improving work condi-
tions. However, over the decades, the MLBPA expanded its economic and political
interests. For example, the MLBPA was involved in the formation and passing of the
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Curt Flood Act in 1998, which put MLB players in the same position as athletes in
other sports with respect to their antitrust rights. The goals of the MLBPA have
changed over time. Presently, their goals are primarily related to compensation and
risk minimization through the protection of guaranteed contracts. Similar to other
American industries over the past century, MLBPA has achieved success on issues such
as hours worked and safety issues, and is now focused on the nuances of retirement
benefits and total compensation.
Like most bargaining situations, the relative power of the MLBPA and MLB owners
determines the outcome, subject to the NLRA and antitrust laws. The necessary con-
ditions for the MLBPA to advance its causes, as with most labor unions, are favorable
product market factors, labor market factors, bargaining structure, and the bargaining
climate.
The key product market factor that affects CBA outcomes is the employer’s ability to
pay (Rainsberger, 2009). This has been a contentious issue for most sports leagues, MLB
included. There has been a lack of trust between the players and owners regarding eco-
nomic profitability and franchise valuations. MLB’s revenues have grown rapidly over
the past decade, and since the 2006 agreement was signed, revenues have grown an esti-
mated 30% as reported annually by Forbes. For example, MLB’s intellectual property
arm, MLB Advanced Media, is reportedly worth $5 billion (Carter, 2011).
Productivity increases are usually another key item in bargaining (Rainsberger,
2009). In MLB, productivity can be addressed in several ways. More games can be
played, although the number of games during the regular season has not been a bar-
gaining issue in MLB, unlike the NFL. There are some exceptions, like adding more
playoff teams, so that more postseason games are played. This was witnessed with the
expansion of the playoffs through the addition of two wild card teams as part of the
2011 CBA. Alternatively, productivity can be measured by the number of units sold per
game (e.g., attendance, viewership, or merchandise), which has risen over time. Player
pay loosely tracks player productivity, measured as marginal revenue product,
notwithstanding structural institutions in place like the reserve clause. At a minimum,
the MLBPA wants player compensation to equal the increases in revenue that occur
because of increases in MRP. Owners may claim, however, that much of the increase
in demand is due to new stadiums, better marketing, better pricing, new licensing
opportunities, and new media outlets.
With respect to labor market factors, the MLBPA may be viewed as both a craft-based
union such as the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and an
industrial union like the United Auto Workers. In other industries, the bargaining
power of such a narrow union might be relatively low because of the substitutability of
similar craft workers in another industry. However, MLB players are highly skilled and
unique; therefore, they are very hard to replace without a loss of productivity.
The MLBPA is also a closed shop; this means that players are automatically part of
the bargaining unit and there is no competitive union. Occasionally, star athletes have
opted out of certain aspects of the MLBPA. For instance, in 2003, Barry Bonds chose
to not participate in the group licensing agreement managed by the MLBPA. He pre-
ferred to sign his own licensing deals for products such as video games and trading
cards instead of automatically being included in the group licensing deal. However,
these cases are extremely rare.
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Another factor that affects owner-union relations in MLB is the bargaining structure
that is in place. Most collective bargaining in the U.S. occurs between firms in an oli-
gopolistic or competitive structure with the workers organized in the form of unions.
While the union may have more monopoly power than the firms have market power,
union strikes are financially painful for union members, so it can be difficult for
unions to commit to lengthy strikes. Professional baseball is a bilateral monopoly.
MLB has no competitors vying for professional baseball talent, notwithstanding a few
MLB players who go overseas to play in countries like Japan or Korea, and the MLBPA
is composed of uniquely skilled professionals with little, if any, external competition.
Given these characteristics and the overall popularity of MLB globally, both sides have
benefitted financially, with MLB generating in excess of $7 billion in annual revenue
and the average MLB player making over $3.3 million a year. There are very few
unions, if any, outside of sport where union members earn that type of average salary.
Due to this, both players and owners can withstand, at extreme financial loss, lengthy
work stoppages. Compared with other sports leagues, MLB players have relatively long
careers and have, at times, been willing to forego millions of dollars in current earn-
ings in exchange for higher future earnings and advancements in other areas such as
pensions, free agency, and salary arbitration.
The 2011 round of collective bargaining in MLB was notable for having been final-
ized over three months prior to the beginning of spring training for next season. In
other words, it did not seem to follow the classic bargaining pattern of early, middle,
and crisis/closing bargaining periods. One reason for a relatively easy agreement
process was that revenues have been rising quickly in MLB. Over the past decade,
league-wide revenues have more than doubled. It appears that both sides recognized
that the fan base was very sensitive to millionaires and billionaires arguing over how
to divide tens of billions of dollars. Two other factors that contributed to the ease of
negotiations were the weak state of the global economy and the nasty public nature of
the negotiations in the NFL and the NBA.
To understand how collective bargaining progresses, it is important to account for
the bargaining climate (Rainsberger, 2009). In the early years of the MLBPA, it fol-
lowed other young unions in negotiating for rights like union recognition; a formal
grievance process; protection against unjust disciplinary action; and contract term,
expiration, and renegotiation provisions. However, even in its infancy MLBPA
addressed economic goals. Currently, the union is interested in areas such as minimum
salaries, health/pension benefits, revenue sharing, and luxury taxes. Another area that
is of high interest to the MLBPA is the mandatory testing procedures for PEDs and the
accompanying penalty system for failed tests. Management is also interested in com-
pensation issues along with competitive balance. Luxury taxes, revenue sharing, and a
salary cap that is desired by most owners are all tools related to compensation and par-
ity. Owners are also interested in retaining all rights not specifically bargained over like
the schedule of games and the number of teams.
Finally, bargaining techniques are a factor in the success of collective bargaining
(Rainsberger, 2009). Typical ground rules include aspects such as the time, place, and
frequency of bargaining sessions; methods of communication between sessions; an
understanding that all agreements are contingent on the entire package being agreed
upon; restrictions on external communications; and the order in which topics will be
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bargained. It is imperative in bargaining that each side be unified in its approach at the
table. This has been a real problem over the years, especially in the mid-1990s, between
large- and small-market clubs on the owners’ side, but less so between journeymen
and star players on the players’ side. Without a salary cap, there are fewer direct dollar-
for-dollar tradeoffs amongst players’ salaries. This is in contrast to other leagues such
as the NBA where, for instance, Michael Jordan allegedly attempted to decertify the
players’ union (Bradley, n.d.; Quirk & Fort, 1999).
The Future
In the next 5–10 years, MLB should see improved competitive balance because rev-
enue- sharing recipients will find it more difficult to avoid using their additional funds
to improve their on-the-field product, and large market clubs will be exempt from
being recipients of revenue-sharing money. The elephant in the room will continue to
be the salary cap, but the competitive balance argument may carry less weight if the
other measures improve competitive balance.
Both owners and players recognize that they need to grow their fan base, both
domestically and internationally. The Industry Growth Fund coming from luxury
taxes will help, as will the growth of the Australian Baseball League and domestic
leagues in other countries. The World Baseball Classic should help speed up the
growth of baseball worldwide, which will position MLB as the premier league for a
new generation of fans (Nagel, Brown, Rascher, & McEvoy, 2010). These issues, while
relatively uncontroversial, will be a focus in future CBAs.
Very soon, all international players will become incorporated into the amateur draft
(partially because they will not be at the table to represent their interests).
Additionally, issues surrounding performance enhancing drugs and how to prevent
their use will grow in importance in the next decade. Similarly, new research on head
injuries will play a role in MLB during the future, with some aspects negotiated at the
bargaining table.
Finally, the major North American sports leagues will continue to converge in terms
of the structure of the relationship between the owners and the players, with MLB
players continuing to have the most relative leverage of the various leagues because of
the average length of players’ careers.
References
Beck, H. (2011, November 4). 50 N.B.A. players considering dissolution of union. The New York
Times, p. B10.
Bloom, H. (2006a, October 24). The good news a new MLB labor accord, the bad news a new
MLB labor accord II. SportsBusiness News. Retrieved from http://www.sports
businessnews.com/_news/news_352522.php
Bloom, B. (2006b, October 25). MLB, union announce a new deal. MLB.com. Retrieved from
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20061024&content_id=1722211&fext=.jsp&c_i
d=mlb
Bradley, R. (n.d.). Labor pains nothing new to the NBA. Retrieved from
http://www.apbr.org/labor.html
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
Carter, D. (2010). Money games: profiting from the convergence of sports and entertainment.
Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books.
Recent Collective Bargaining in Major League Baseball
Coates, D., & Harrison, T. (2005). Baseball strikes and the demand for attendance. Journal of
Sports Economics 6(3), 282–302.
Covington, R. (2003). (How much) is the law to blame for baseball’s turbulent labor relations?
Journal of Sports Economics 4(4), 356–361.
Dosh, K. (2007, June 28). Does revenue sharing in MLB foster competitive balance? Retrieved
on from http://mvn.com/mlb-braves/2007/06/28/does-revenue-sharing-in-mlbfoster-com-
petitive-balance/
Gould, W. (2011). Bargaining with baseball. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc.
Hakes, J. & Turner, C. (2011). Pay, productivity and aging in Major League Baseball. Journal of
Productivity Analysis, 35(1), pp. 61–74.
History of the Major League Baseball Players Association. (2012) . MLBPlayers.com. Retrieved
from http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp
Kovacevic, D. (2005, May 1). The debate about the Pirates’ demise always comes back to team
payroll: In the age of revenue sharing and television contracts, how much are the Pirates
making and what are they doing with the profits? Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, p. C-1.
Krautmann, A., von Allmen, P., & Berri, D. (2009). The underpayment of restricted players in
North American Sports leagues. International Journal of Sport Finance, 4, 161–175.
Matheson, V. (2006). The effects of labour strikes on consumer demand in professional sports:
revisited. Applied Economics 38(10), pp. 1173–1179.
Maxcy, J. (2009). Progressive revenue sharing in Major League Baseball: The effect on player
transfers and talent distribution. Review of Industrial Organization, 35, 275–297.
Nagel, M., Brown, M., Rascher, D., & McEvoy, C. (2010). Expanding global consumer market for
American sports: The World Baseball Classic. In C. Santo & G. Mildner (Eds.), Sport and
public policy (pp. 215–229). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Noll, R. (2003). The economics of baseball contraction. Journal of Sports Economics, 4(4),
367–388.
O’Reilly, N. (2011). Experimental design methods in sport management research: The playoff
safety bias. Journal of Sport Management, 25(3), pp. 217–228.
Quirk, J., & Fort, R. (1999). Hard ball. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rainsberger, P. (2009, April 29). Historical models of collective bargaining in the U.S. University
of Missouri Extension. Retrieved from http://labored.missouri.edu/research/historical.htm
Schmidt, M., & Berri, D. (2002). The impact of the 1981 and 1994–1995 strikes and major league
baseball attendance: A time-series analysis. Applied Economics, 34, 471–478.
Schmidt, M., & Berri, D. (2004). The impact of labor strikes on consumer demand: An applica-
tion to professional sports. American Economic Review, 94, 344–357.
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 516 F.Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Singer-Vine, J. (2011, July 21). Did the NFL players get a raw deal? Slate. Retrieved from
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2011/07/did_the_nfl_players_g
et_a_raw_deal.html
Snel, A. (2005, April 20). As Rays whiff, front office scores. Tampa Bay Online. Retrieved from
http://news.tbo.com
Staudohar, P. D. (2000). Diamond mines: Baseball & labor. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press.
Summary of Major League Baseball Players Association – Major League Baseball Agreement.
(2011). Retrieved from http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/2011_CBA.pdf
Vrooman, J. (2009). Theory of the perfect game: Competitive balance in monopoly spots
leagues. Review of Industrial Organization, 34(1), pp. 5–44.
Weir, T. (2002, October 16). New revenue likely won’t help payrolls. USA Today. Retrieved from
http://www.usatoday. com
Volume 7 • Number 2 • 2012 • IJSF 207
Rascher, DeSchriver
Zimbalist, A. (2003a). Labor relations in Major League Baseball. Journal of Sports Economics,
4(4), pp. 332–355.
Zimbalist, A. S. (2003b) May the best team win: Baseball economics and public policy.Washington,
D.C: Brookings Institution.
Zimbalist, A. (2010). Reflections on salary shares and salary caps. Journal of Sports Economics,
11(1), pp. 17–28.
Endnotes
1 The definitions of basketball-related income, hockey-related revenue, and total revenue take up
dozens of pages in the respective CBAs, but over time have expanded to include more revenue
streams.
2 The NFL deal was agreed upon on July 21, 2011; the NBA deal was reached on November 26,
2011; and MLB’s deal was reached on November 17, 2011.
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